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Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of ethical theory has 
been its various attempts to use some sort of metaphysical 
entity or some conception of "human nature" to establish an 
absolute, universal ground. Jean-Paul Sartre stands out in the 
existentialist tradition as having made vigorous claims against 
both of these"grounds." Yet, Sartre' s analysis of human reality 
does not resolve the problem of grounding ethics; instead, he 
claims that each individual, through subjective choosing and 
concrete action, creates value. In some sense, this view still 
leads to a grounding of sorts: value is possible only on the basis 
of subjectivity, for, liTo choose between this or that is at the 
same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen.lfl Sartre' s 
solution to the problem of absolute ethical universals comes at 
the expense of shared, public values-for him, all valuing is 
relative to the individual. According to such a theory, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky's claim that "If God did not exist, everything 
would be permitted" is correct, as Sartre readily admits. 
My contention in this paper is that a rejection of ethical 
absolutes does not inevitably lead to Sartrean relativism, nor 
does it deny the existence of values. Despite Dostoevsky's and 
Sartre's claims, our ordinary experience of values and ethical 
decision-making arises throughshared public practices. Sartre 
claims to be doing phenomenology, which should account for 
our ordinary experiences. However, once he has introduced 
subjectivity, an account of ordinary experience is impossible, as 
all human practices are possible only on the basis of subjectiv­
ity. In order to seek out ethics in its original home-that is, 
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where we originally experience value-it is necessary that the 
shared practices of ordinary experience be accounted for. It is 
the task of this paper to show: 
I) howSartre uses a traditional subject I object distinc­
tion in his investigation of consciousness and why it 
leads to the conclusion that subjectivity is the source 
of value; 
II) how Martin Heidegger's phenomenological ac­
count of Dasein affords a criticism of Sartre's ontol­
ogy and accounts for shared practices; and 
III) how sucha critique avoids the Sartrean relativism 
regarding values and where it leads us instead. 
I aim to show that the type of relativism that Sartre con­
cludes with isolates values from the world, and that this is 
impossible, because values are social. 
I 
I wi1l now offer a brief exposition of Sartre's account of 
consciousness to show that it is dependent upon a traditional 
subject! object distinction and that it inevitably leads to ethical 
relativism. Because Sartre is doing phenomenology in the 
tradition of Husserl, all he has to begin with are objects as they 
are revealed to us. Sartre's preliminary examination shows 
that part of the phenomenal condition of objects is that they are 
revealed to something. Thus, Sartre's examination first refers 
us to a "knower," a being which knows or "reveals" objects as 
what they are. 
In the first place, Sartre claims that an account of being 
cannot reduce "being to the knowledge which we have of it," 
as idealism has done, nor can it take knowledge as a given, as 
realism has done.2 He rejects these methods because knowl­
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edge itself caIU10t account for being. To talk of knowing is to 
presuppose existence, or at least the existence of a knower. No 
account of knowledge can be fruitful without an account of this 
knower. This knower refers us to the basis for knowledge-the 
being of the knower-which Sartre calls "consciousness": 
The law of being in the knowing subject is to-be­
conscious. Consciousness is not a mode of particular 
knowledge which may be called an inner meaning or 
self-knowledge; it is the dimension of 
transphenomenal being in the subject .... It is in itself 
something other than a knowledge turned back upon 
itself. 3 
Sartre takes from Husserl his fundamental characteriza­
tion of consciousness, that is, "All consciousness is conscious­
ness ofsomething."4 As such, consciousness is intentional, as a 
directional activity toward some thing outside of conscious­
ness. However, consciousness is contingent upon the neces­
sary and ,sufficient condition that it also be consciousness of 
itself.~ In oHler words, "consciousness is directly an awareness 
of ~;omething other than itself and simultaneously and indi­
rectly an awareness of itself."I) 
Ye t, a consciousness thatis directed outward establishes 
at once a connection between itself and the world. In his 
preliminary examination of consciousness, Smtre provides an 
ontological proof that shows that consciousness is "born sup­
ported by a being which is not itsel£."7 As a "revealing intuition," 
consciousness is by virtue of the fact that it can reveal some­
thing outside itself. We need not examine consciousness itself 
to determine what it "knows" oHhe world-revealinga "world/ 
is precisely what consciousness is as a spontaneous activity 
directed outward. This intentional characteristic requires that 
the object not be a thing residing in consciousness, for con­
sciollsness is a "positional consciousness of the world."11 As 
such, consciousness establishes a world of entities outside of it 
which are not it and therefore must have their own being: 
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Sartre wishes to keep a delicate balance-insisting 
that consciousness is intentional and therefore neces­
sarily related to an object other than itself, and yet 
insisting that the being of consciousness and the 
being of the thing known are not reducible to the 
consciousness-of-the-object.9 
Consciousness is, for Sartre, a "nonsubstantial abso­
lute": consciousness is never relative to the object known, and 
therefore, is absolute; and consciousness is just pure revelation 
of a being, without self-identity, and therefore, is 
nonsubstantiaVo hl fact, it is precisely because consciousness 
is fundamentally a lack that it can never have the self-identity 
and fullness ofbeing that is characteristic of objects. By virtue 
of this lack, which Sartre calls /Inothingness/' consciousness is 
perfectly translucent-a contentless revealing of something 
which it is not. Nothingness lies at the heart of consciousness 
and distinguishes human reality from the being of things. 
Hence the two divisions of being which title his work: Being 
and Nothingness. While this distinction appears radical, a 
closer look reveals that it is reminiscent of the Cartesian 
subject) object model, in that consciousness is a subject iso­
lated from objects which it "knows." The traditional subject) 
object distinction, which Sartre employs from the start, ob­
scures his account of ethics. 
In the end, Sartre shows that what makes possible 
consciousness' yaluing of entities, actions, situations and the 
world is this fundamental nothingness. At the heart ofhuman 
reality is nothing, and surrounding it on all sides is facticity­
situation.11 Lacking all identity and content, human reality is 
completely free; it is freedom. Yet, it is not free to be its own 
foundation: it is abandoned in a factical world to create itself, 
therefore 1/existence precedes essence." Only on the basis of its 
fundamental nothingness can human reality establish an "es­
sence," be free to make choices, posit value, or know the world: 
"Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and ob­
stacles which it has not created, but these resistances and 
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obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice 
which human-reality is.''12 Only a beingwhichhasnothlngness 
at its core is free to create value, but objects are being tl11'ough 
and through. Ethical values then, are not to be found within the 
world of "things" ; this realm of being is completely dependent 
on free consciousness for its ethical significance: 
...we have neither behind us, nor before us in a lumi­
nous realm of values, any means of justification or 
excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is 
what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be 
free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, 
yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment 
that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for 
everything he doesP 
The force of this claim sets in later when Sartre says: /I every 
man, without any support or help whatever, is condemned at 
every instant to invent man./l14 Every individual is responsible 
for creating both him/herself and humanity, yet individual 
choices cannot be helped by "Man"-they must be created by 
each individual. Values are grounded on the concrete "noth­
ing" of each subjectivity as it chooses and actively creates itself: 
"You are free, therefore choose-that is to say, invent. No lUle 
of general morality can show you what you ought to do; no 
signs are vouchsafed in this world. illS The ability to choose and 
act, and thereby "invent" values is only possible on the basis of 
free consciousness. Therefore, all values are relative to each 
individual and arise in the world only when this individual 
chooses and acts in concrete situations. 
II 
We have seen that the foundation for Sartre's account of 
consciousness is the distinction between subjects and objects. I 
will now offer a Heideggerian critique of this distinction to 
show that it produces a distorted view of how human beings 
experience the world and leads to the untenable conclusion of 
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ethical relativism. 
Sartre begins by investigating the way objects are re­
vealed to consciousness. This method leads him to claim that 
consciousness, as the activity of revealing objects, is the essen­
tial way humans experience the world. Heidegger rejects this 
sort of account of human experience and points to the subject / 
object model as the source of confusion: "It in the ontology of 
Dasein, we'take our departure' from a worldless 'I' in order to 
provide this 'I' with an object and an ontologically baseless 
relation to that object, then we have 'presupposed' not too 
much, but too little."16 For Heidegger, the subject/ object model 
presupposes "too little" because it only accounts for one way 
of experiencing the world. 
In an attempt to avoid Cartesian talk of subjects and 
objects altogether, Heidegger begins his account with "Dasein./I 
Dasein is just each one of us-individual human beings. In 
contrast to Sartre's reworking of the Cartesian subject, Dasein 
is not a "self-sufficient source of all meaning and intelligibil­
ity."17 Rather, Dasein designates the human way of being. 
According to Heidegger, the subject/ object model, like that 
employed by Sartre, fails to account for Dasein's ordinary way 
of being by skipping over what is closest to Dasein-its "aver­
age everydayness." 
Heidegger's account of average everydayness shows 
that Dasein's ordinary experience neither rests on nor reveals 
anything like "subjects" or "objects."18 The "world" is that 
which Dasein first encounters in its average everydayness: the 
"environment" and those things Dasein uses in the environ­
ment.19 Dasein's ordinary experience is not one of reflecting on 
or knowing the environment, but a "concernful" dealing with 
and use of things in the environment: 
... the kind ofbeing which belongs to such concemful 
dealings is not one into which we need to put our­
selves first. This is the way in which everyday Dasein 
always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the 
doorknob.20 . 
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While Sartre follows Descartes by describing objects as they 
lie before a subject who grasps themcognitively, for Heidegger, 
objects are not things we ordinarily need to Ifget to." They are 
"ready-to-hand" as those things right here that we are using, 
and in use, that we are not reflecting on. In use, they withdraw 
as objects. Ordinarily, they are always ready-to-hand for us: 
when I rush out the door in the morning, the car is ready to be 
used, and instead of looking at it and thinking about getting 
into it, I jump in, turn the key and speed away. On Sartre's 
account, the car is primarily what Heidegger calls "present-at­
hand"-itis an objectwhich I knowbecause I behold the car qua 
car. By taking the car as essentially present-at-hand, Sartre fails 
to account for the fact that ordinarily, I do not need to reflect on 
the car-I just use it. 
Although the practices of everyday experience may 
refer us to a user, an examination of a user does not require an 
examination of the user's consciousness. This is because a 
phenomenological account of use does not prompt us to sup­
pose that things whichare ready-to-hand are atbottompresent­
at-hand. In everyday experience an object is not, strictly 
speaking, encountered at all. Instead, ready-to-hand things are 
just what get llsed and produced as a means of accomplishing 
some goal with whichDaseinisconcerned. A description of the 
way Dasein ordinarily uses things dispels the notion of objects 
as "reflected on"; "the perceiving of what is known is not a 
process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of con­
sciousness after one has gone out and grasped it.H21 But for 
Sartre, this is exactly what experience is, as his descriptions of 
consciousness in the introduction to Being and Nothingness 
show: "Consciousness is ... the dimension of transphenomenal 
being in the subject;" IIAll consciousness is positional in th.at it 
transcends itself in order to reach an object;" "All that there is 
of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the 
outside;" and "The perceived being is before consciousness; 
consciousness can not reach it, and it can not enter into con­
sciousness."22 Sal"tre's subject / object model precludes a strict 
phenomenological account, which reveals instead that when 
"we carefully describe everyday ... activity [we] do not find 
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any mental states" --i.e., any "beholding" or "knowing."23 
Heidegger's phenomenological method has critical con­
sequences for the Sartrean model of subjectivity precisely be­
cause he shows that knowing is not part of our everyday 
experiences. Dasein's ordinary experience is not a "knowing" 
experience, but a useful involvement with other entities in the 
world. Therefore Sartre' Saccountofsubjects andobjects cannot 
stand alone; it must be based on a prior phenomenological 
description of use. Using things is primary to Dasein' s ordinary 
experience: "what is revealed by use is ontologically more 
fundamental than the substances with determinate, context­
free properties revealed by detached contemplation."24 It is 
only upon use that we speak of subjects and objects. It is a 
"breakdown" of this average everyday use that puts Dasein in 
a position of reflecting on an object. When I jump into the car 
and, two miles down the road, it breaks down, I am forced to 
reflect on it as present-at-hand. It is no longer something that 
goes along with me in my use; instead, I get out of the car, kick 
it and stare at it. It is just the object: "car./I But, ordinarily, I do 
not reflect on the car qua car at all. According to Sartre, 
reflecting on objects is primary, and ordinary use must be 
established. Therefore, his account distorts ordinary human 
experience. What for Heidegger is a secondary and derivative 
experience of the world is for Sartre the ontological basis of 
human reality. 
Dasein's everyday use and involvements are the back­
ground upon which Sartre's subject! object distinction is pos­
sible. Prior to "knowing" this world, Dasein is already familiar 
with this world, already using things, already interpreting itself 
and this world, and already having a way of being. This means 
that Dasein has not in and of itself established practices, ac­
quired understanding, posited uses, or intended meanings for 
things. These things are not experienced as the product ofone's 
consciousness, but they arise out of a context of shared, public 
practices. No individual object ever shows up in the wodd as 
it is in and of itself, but /Ialways is in terms of its belonging to 
other equipment" in a context,25 Dasein does not ordinarily 
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behold this context as a situation which lies before it. Rather, 
Dasein dwells in this context in a familiar a~d involved way, 
whichHeidegger calls Being-in-the-world. Ordinarily, Dasein 
uses things in a context with which it already familiar, in 
whichthe things are used inorder to do something. To say that 
the subject/ object distinction is only possible due to a break­
down of everyday use is also to say that a context of shared, 
public practices, which makes use possible, is ontologically 
prior. 
Yet, Sartre has not failed altogether to address the im­
portance of a worldly context. Once he has abstracted subject 
and object in order to analyze them, he establishes that they 
form a totality of flbeing-in-the-world" which "has a real 
priority over its conceptually distinct parts."26 Sartre claims: 
In truth the cogito must be our point of departure, but 
we can say of it, parodying a famous saying, that it 
leads us only on condition that we get out of it. Our 
preceding study ... had as its goal only to place us in 
a position to question the cogito about its being and to 
furnish llS with the dialectic instrument which would 
enable us to find in the cogito itself the means of 
escaping from instantaneity toward the totality of 
. being which constitutes human reality.27 
The trouble, for Sartre, is that being-in-the-world needs to 
be established: liThe I scandal of philosophy' is not that this 
proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and 
attempted again and again. .. IfDasein is understood correctly, 
it defies such proofs, because, in its Beulg, it already is what 
subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it."28 For 
Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is onto logically prior and can­
notbe divided into /I two radically separated regions ofbeing," 
where a relation between subject and object must be estab­
lished: 29 
When Dasein directs itself towards something and 
grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an hmer 
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sphere in which ithas been proximally encapsulated, 
but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 
'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which 
belong to a world already discovered .30 
As soon as the subject / object model is assumed by Sartre, 
human reality is abstracted from any public, worldly context. 
The Sartrean claim that later, contextual experience can be 
constructed and explained as a "totality of su bjects and objects/' 
is precisely the theoretical distortion of human reality that 
results from the Cartesian modeL This is because, 
In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by 
this way in which things have been interpreted, set 
before the open country of a 'world-in-itself' so that it 
just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of 
the public way in which things have been interpreted 
has already been decisi ve even for the possibilities of 
having a mood-that is, for the basic way in which 
Dasein lets the world 'matter' to itPl 
Since Sartre needs to establish being-in-the-world, he 
also needs to establish the meanings and values enc()un tercd in 
ordinary experience. He establishes them as the products of 
subjectivity: "everyman, without any support or help whatever, is 
condemned at every instant to invent man."32 The ontological 
gap between subject and worldly context is what allows Smtre 
to claim that "Consciousness is not a being but the activity 
whereby a human being recasts an impersonal universe in the 
form of the human life world.// 33 Where consciousness is the 
foundation of all experience, meanings and values are all 
relative to the intentional projects of individuals-finally m.ak~ 
ing public, shared meanings and values impossihle. This 
overlooks the fact thatvalues can only arise out ofpractices and 
uses which are public and which Dasein is all'eady involved in. 
There is already a context of practices which makes use pos~ 
sible-and it is because Dasein uses things within this context 
that meanings and values arise. Dasein is never in a position to 
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"create" the world ex nihilo, for this world and Dasein's expe­
riences in it are not "impersonal," but are always already 
meaningful. 
III 
These ordinary experiences are always already mean­
ingful because the context in which they are carried out is a 
public one. Because this context has ontological priority over 
consciousness, Dasein is not involved in practices and uses in 
isolation, but always with Others. This is not to say that Dasein 
has "knowledge" of Others as "subjects" which are encoun­
tered. It is only when there is a breakdown of ordinary public 
practices that Others show up as "subjects" for Dasein. Ordi­
narily, Others are experienced as those with whom Dasein is 
coping and involved. Through this public sphere of everyday 
activity, Daseinhas always already been interpreted by Others, 
existed for Others and been with Others. In everyday experi­
ence, Dasein is absorbed in the world in such a way that it is 
indistinguishable from Others. Dasein's involvement in the 
world is no t distinct: Dasein is depressed as "one" is depressed, 
talks a~ "one" talks, judges as "one" judges and behaves as 
"one" behaves.:14 In everyday activities, Dasein' s involvements 
in the world are taken on as "one" takes them on. 
The public realm of the"one" dictates those norms by 
which every aspect of social life is organized. Dasein has 
always already takenonspecific norms in a specific context and 
understood them. However, public practices occur in many 
different contexts and have many different meanings-what 
the "one" says in one context may very well be the exact 
opposite of what the"one" says in another context. It is notthat 
Dasein in each case does exactly what the"one" says-Dasein 
may also reject what the"one" does, modify what the"one" 
says, or ignore what the "one" thinks, etc. However, it is only 
on the basis of the established, understoodnorms whichDasein 
has already taken on that such modification occurs. Values 
arise through the public practices engaged in by Dasein with 
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others. It is because of the public context of the "one" that there 
are practices, and it is only because there are practices that 
there are values. 
Dasein's ethical decision-making, which includes vari­
ous sorts of activities-weighingconsequences, following and 
rejecting ethical principles, compromising differences, etc.-is 
always carried outwithin a context and upon the background 
of established ethical practices. These public practices are not 
something which Dasein must first get "into" and then some­
times gets "out" of. Sartre's notion that valuing things or 
making ethical decisions are activities which are done"subjec­
tively," and, as it were, "privately," entirely misconstrues the 
nature of what it is to do these things. If we carry our 
Heideggerian critique of Sartre through to the end, the conclu­
sionwe reach is that values are not grounded in subjectivity­
pure subjectivity is the result of breakdown, which occurs on 
an always already established background of public contexts 
and practices. What is primary is the context: we cannot 
remove ethics from its public context and expect to show that 
individuals, through subjective positing, 1/establish" value in 
the world. Hence, values and ethical decision-making are 
things which Dasein is already familiar with in its everyday 
coping with others. Dasein becomes familiar with them as it 
'sees' them at work and uses them. We could say then, that 
following an ethics, upholding a value, or making an ethical 
decision consists in going by a "sign-post," a principle, which 
is customary, familiar and already undeI'stood.35 
This is not to say that situations of ethical detachment 
do notoccur, but that they are analogous to beholding anobject 
as present-at-hand. Situations in which we pull back from OUI' 
ordinary involvement and say "what do I do now?" are situa­
tions of ethical breakdown. Such a stance is possible only 
because in ordinary practice, we use values and make ethical 
decisions all the time without placing the situation before us as 
present-at-hand. In ordinary experience, I do not pull back 
from my everyday affaiI's with others and ask myself if I 
should kill them or not-the question never arises. In every­
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day practice I just don't do it, thereby upholding something 
which is valuable within the context and practices that I dwell 
in. 
While such an accotmt of public practices shows that 
values cannot be grounded in subjectivity, neither are they 
grounded in the objective world: there is value only because 
there are public practices. This does not mean that values are 
grounded in the world, but that they are groundless, based 
only on ongoing, changing and multiple human practices and 
contexts, Public practices are all that constitute the values 
which Dasein copes with, but these practices themselves are 
grounded in nothing. Hubert Dreyfus points out the signifi­
cance of the Heideggerian stance: 
Traditionally all meanings have been traced back to 
some final self-intelligible, most real, occurrent source, 
e.g. the Good, God, or the transcendental ego. The 
1/oneil as ultimate reality ... a philosophical version of 
God-cannot supply this sort of intelligibility, It can 
never be made completely explicit and justified. It 
. contains an understanding of being and accounts for 
all intelligibility, yet it is no sort of intelligible thing at 
all.3(, 
The lack of intelligibility in the publicness of the "oneil is 
just its groundlessness. While the public sphere of the /Ione" is 
always already given, and provides the background of intelli­
gibility and meaning for Dasein's everyday practices, it is not 
a foundation beneath these practices. The IIoneil is constituted 
by nothing more than these ordinary practices and it is only 
because there are ordinary practices that Dasein understands 
meaning and value. As a particular way of taking up these 
public practices, ethics can only "occur" as the human en­
deavor to best "put to use" the meanings and values which are 
always already there,· 
Therefore, what is at issue is ethical theory -if values 
are not grounded in subjectivity or the world itself, nor insome 
transcendent Being, we reach a point where there is no funda­
64 SUBJECTIVITY VS. USE 
mental justification for values, no absolute ground. The desire 
to construct an ethical theory is itself based on the precepts that 
there is a foundation upon which such theory can be built, and 
thatwe need only to "tease out" this foundation from everyday 
experience. Since uses and practices are themselves grounded 
on nothing, but always already there, there is nothing for 
theOlY to stand on. The attempt to find absolute justifications 
for right and wrong is precisely the attempt to take ethics out 
of practice and make it conform to a theoretical system. 
This does not mean that all values must be equally 
respected or are equally meaningful for everyone, however. 
Dasein is always already in a specific environment, culture and 
historyr involved in specific practices and uses. Claims which 
favor cultural relativism are based on the mistaken supposition 
that getting out of all contexts and practices of ethical valuation 
is possible. But to be indifferent to one sort of context or practice 
of valuing is only to accept another, however rudimentary. 
Likewise, to acrept some value is to reject others. In no case can 
one be indifferent to or accepting of all possible contexts and 
practices of valuing. This is because "Being-in is not a 'prop­
erty' which D asein sometimes has and sometimes does not 
have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with 
it. Itisnotthe case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, 
a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world'-aworld whichhe 
provideshimself with occasionally."37 What counts as valuable 
or ethicallnay be relative to a specific context of practices, but 
is never relative to an individual. But to say that values are 
relative to a certain culture, forinstance, is only to say that there 
are many public practices employed by many different groups 
and that the values that arise out of these practices are ethical 
for them. It is 011 the basis of what they hold ethical that they see 
the practices and values of other groups as unethical. It is their 
own practices and uses of values that allow them to say with 
conviction that /I child abuse is wrong," or "racism is unethi­
caV' 
In no way can Dasein shed its Being-in-the-world so as 
to "view" all values from a context-free perspective. It is 
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precisely because we do have public practices that there is 
anything like value or ways of taking up these practices ethi­
cally. It is because Dasein in each case engages in particular 
practices in particular public contexts that Dasein always has a 
particular way of taking up these practices ethically. Dasein's 
everyday experience of values is not such that all values are 
experienced on an equal plane. To say that there is no "true" 
value if our ethical valuations calUl.ot be absolutely justified­
by God, by Dasein or by the world-is still to suppose that 
without foundation, values CalUl.ot exist. Yet, in everyday 
practice and coping, values are experienced. Despite the lack of 
a single absolute, universal ground, Dasein does use values; 
and in Dasein' s ordinary experience, everything is not permit­
ted. 
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